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ABSTRACT ■ This article examines the impact of national industrial relations
institutions on pay movements in Britain and Germany between 1980 and
2000. Pay increases are slightly higher in Britain, despite the breakdown of
multi-employer bargaining and agreements in the UK and their persistence in
Germany. Evidence shows that pay decisions in Britain are mainly determined
by imitation and not by markets. The article suggests that a system of ‘pay
benchmarking’ in Britain acts as a substitute for the German ‘sectoral
agreement model’ and explains similarities in pay movements.
KEYWORDS: industrial relations ■ pay determination ■ pay developments ■
collective bargaining ■ cross-country comparison ■ United Kingdom ■ Germany
Industrial Relations in Britain and Germany
Industrial relations institutions in Britain and Germany have diverged
during the past quarter century. In Britain, multi-employer bargaining
and collective agreements at sectoral level have almost disappeared. In
Germany, while the institution of the sectoral agreement has been
weakened, it remains basically intact.
In the German system of industrial relations, pay and conditions are
negotiated at sectoral level, while statutory works councils monitor the
implementation of collective agreements and statutory employment
rights, and day-to-day conditions of work at establishment level. In other
words, employers’ associations and trade unions are responsible for regu-
lating the terms of trade for labour as a commodity, while managers and
works councils deal with the practical conditions of employment.
In recent years, there have been some changes: many sectoral agree-
ments now include ‘opening’ or ‘hardship’ clauses, which allow manage-
ment and works councils to renegotiate parts of the agreement. There are
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an increasing number of illegal violations of sectoral agreements, often
tolerated or even approved by works councils. This shift towards the
establishment level can be regarded as a sign of erosion (Bahnmüller and
Bispinck, 1995; Hassel, 1999), as can the decrease in union density from
39.7 percent in 1980 to 29.8 percent in 2000 (Ebbinghaus, 2002).
However, the coverage of collective bargaining remains high. In 2002,
according to the Establishment Panel of the German Institute for
Employment Research (IAB), 70 percent of employees in West Germany
and 55 percent in East Germany were covered by collective agreements
and a further 15 percent and 23 percent, respectively, worked in firms
which observed the collectively agreed conditions. Thus, only 14 percent
and 22 percent, respectively, did not work under conditions influenced
by collective agreements (WSI, 2002). Works councils remain important
(Frege, 2002). Hence we can still speak of a system of industrial relations
in Germany (Locke and Kochan, 1995), or at least in West Germany, on
which we focus.
In Britain, the decline of collective bargaining has been more
pronounced. Multi-employer bargaining in the private sector has largely
collapsed, giving way to single-employer bargaining or, increasingly,
none at all. According to the Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS), the collective bargaining coverage rate fell from 70 percent of
all employees in 1984 to 54 percent in 1990 and to 41 percent in 1998. By
2004, only 34 percent of employees in private manufacturing had their
pay set by collective bargaining, as against 75 percent in the public sector
(Kersley et al., 2005: 20–1; Millward et al., 1999: 242). It seems question-
able whether one should speak of a system of industrial relations in
Britain any longer, and the term ‘industrial relations’ is often replaced by
‘employee relations’ (Cully et al., 1999; Hollinshead et al., 1999).
The Impact of Industrial Relations on Pay
From established, ‘orthodox’ perspectives the impact on pay of these
institutional trends is clear. The demise of multi-employer bargaining in
Britain, and the decline of collective bargaining more generally, should
result in stagnant or falling pay or, at best, smaller pay rises. Decentral-
ization of pay determination should also lead to wider wage dispersion
between and within sectors. From a neo-classical point of view, wages
will fall to a market-clearing level (one which eliminates unemployment).
Pay should not increase until full employment is achieved, and may not
do so even then because of weak union power.
By contrast, more strongly institutionalized industrial relations in
Germany should enable wages to rise above the market level; while multi-
employer collective agreements should lead to pay uniformity within
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industrial sectors. If one assumes that industrial relations institutions
matter, one would expect higher pay increases in Germany than in
Britain, and a lower dispersion of wages. A contrary effect would occur
only if the more institutionalized German system imposed pay discipline
not only on employers, but also on trade unions.
However, the assumption that wages above the market level necessarily
decrease without the distorting impact of industrial relations institutions
is not common to all explanations of wage determination. From the
perspective of efficiency wage theories, wages are neither purely deter-
mined by the market nor necessarily a result of power relations between
capital and labour. According to the classical formulation by Marshall,
these wages are paid ‘with reference to the exertion of ability and
efficiency required of the worker’ (1920: VI.III.9). A variety of models
have been developed within this framework, emphasizing the incomplete-
ness of the labour contract, which gives workers the chance for oppor-
tunism (or shirking). Since monitoring the achievement of employees is
usually costly and imperfect, employers pay above equilibrium wages in
lieu of extensive monitoring. Such efficiency effects may be more promi-
nent under the less institutionalized conditions found in Britain.
A variant of this approach is Bewley’s ‘morale theory’ of wage deter-
mination, which aims to explain why, in the USA, ‘wages don’t fall during
a recession’. He observes that ‘the level of pay itself has little impact on
morale, unless pay is so low as to be perceived as grossly unfair . . . Only
pay cuts or inadequate raises affect morale, and do so negatively.’ Morale,
he argues, ‘is important in large part because management finds it prohib-
itively expensive to monitor employees closely’, and additionally,
‘workers are likely to be so cooperative only if they have good morale’
(Bewley, 1999: 432–5).
From this perspective, the different trends in industrial relations insti-
tutions in Britain and Germany may be of minor importance. However,
Bewley does not explain what ‘inadequate raises’ are, and which pay rises
would be adequate. Although he states that ‘most workers know little
about pay levels outside their own organization’, he argues further that
the relation to outside pay is important for ‘a firm’s supply of labor,
which in practical terms means turnover and the number and quality of
workers the business can attract and retain’. Besides a touch of contra-
diction in this statement, it is a labour market argument which is juxta-
posed to his crucial argumentation. We can assume that the pay levels of
other firms are important, although the relations between employers’
wage decisions are not sufficiently explained.
Neo-institutionalist theorists offer an alternative approach. Even
though not originally developed to explain wage determination, their
concepts may be helpful for our purposes. Meyer and Rowan observe
that organizations ‘incorporate elements which are legitimated externally,
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rather than in terms of efficiency’, and that ‘institutional isomorphism
promotes the success and survival of organizations. Incorporating exter-
nally legitimated formal structures increases the commitment of internal
participants and external constituents’ (1977: 348–9). DiMaggio and
Powell cite three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism
occurs: ‘(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and
the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from
standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism,
associated with professionalization’ (1983: 150). These mechanisms are
effective within ‘organization fields’, that is, areas of institutional life that
include ‘key suppliers, product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other
organizations that produce similar services or products’ (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983: 148). This definition comes near to that of industrial
sectors, but includes not only competing firms and allows differentiation
between distinct dimensions of institutionalized fields with differing
ranges. For example, a firm can belong to different organizational fields
with regard to wages or product markets.
Applied to the issue of wage determination, in particular to decisions
over pay rises, influences other than the labour market and traditional
industrial relations institutions need to be considered. In Germany,
coercive determination by means of sectoral agreements may be the
prevailing feature, while in Britain wages could be determined to a larger
extent by, for example, mimetic mechanisms, since pronounced uncer-
tainty remains in consequence of the absence of multi-employer bargain-
ing. According to this neo-institutionalist approach, pay rises within
organizational fields may not be higher or more uniform in Germany
than in Britain. Nevertheless, some questions remain open in this alterna-
tive approach, particularly, how the different mechanisms can be assessed
and what consequences can be expected in pay movements.
Pay Trends in Britain and Germany
Our research is based on two sectors which differ markedly within both
countries: engineering and retail distribution. In both Britain and
Germany, engineering has a strong tradition of collective bargaining. In
British retailing, multi-employer agreements were established in 1951,
but never gained the same importance as in engineering. Wages were
formerly regulated by Wages Councils and are now underpinned by the
National Minimum Wage (which has virtually no effect in engineering).
Multi-employer bargaining was abandoned in both sectors at the end of
the 1980s. In German retailing, in contrast to engineering, sectoral agree-
ments until recently usually received statutory extension to non-
signatory employers.
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We briefly describe wage trends in both countries since 1980, using
data from the British Office for National Statistics (New Earnings Survey
or NES) and the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Verdiensterhebung). We also refer to published data from the
OECD (2001), the former German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs (BMA, 2001), the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey
1998 (WERS98) (Cully et al., 1999; Millward et al., 2000), and the Indus-
trial Relations Research Unit’s Pay and Working Time Survey (Arrow-
smith and Sisson, 1999, 2001).
In addition, we conducted a postal company survey for Germany in
1998 (Jauch and Schmidt, 2000; Schmidt, 2004). The questionnaire
consisted of 25 pages and included detailed questions concerning pay
levels, pay rises, pay components, grading structures, and collective
bargaining. The survey was targeted at engineering, retail, and printing.
In order to avoid a bias towards companies covered by collective agree-
ments, we did not use addresses from employers’ associations or trade
unions, but purchased addresses from a commercial supplier; unfortu-
nately, many addresses were outdated or the companies belonged to other
sectors. The response rate was about 15.5 percent, with 346 returned
questionnaires from the engineering sector and 133 from the retail sector.
We do not claim statistical representativeness for this survey, but for engi-
neering the proportion of companies in the sample with 100–499,
500–999, and more than 1000 employees comes near to that of the popu-
lation; in retail, larger companies are over-represented.
We have also drawn on the work of Arrowsmith and Sisson and on the
WERS98 publications. In addition, we conducted 14 interviews in Britain
between 1998 and 2002 and 15 in Germany (in some cases with Peter
Jauch). We spoke to managers, trade unionists, and representatives of
employers’ associations. Furthermore, in the German case, we also spoke
to works council members in four companies active in both Britain and
Germany, and in the British case, to the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and two organizations involved in collecting information
about pay settlements. The interviews with managers were conducted at
a UK-owned manufacturer of electronic security systems, a UK-owned
aviation company, a German-owned car supplier and a UK-owned high-
street retailer. In Germany, we spoke to works council members at all
workplaces and with officials from IG Metall and Ver.di. In Britain, we
conducted interviews with representatives of the Trades Union Congress
(TUC), the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), the
Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU, now Amicus)
and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW).
Interviews with employers’ associations were carried out with the Engi-
neering Employers’ Federation (EEF) and the British Retail Consortium
(BRC) in the UK, and with the Association of German Trade and Retail
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(HDE) and a regional officer from the Employers’ Association for the
Metal and Electrical Industry (VMI, now Südwestmetall) in Germany.
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted about two hours. The
focus was on pay and working-time arrangements as well as on general
developments in industrial relations in the sectors.
The following description focuses on quantitative changes in average
pay levels, the dispersion of pay, and the incidence of variable pay, with
particular attention to engineering and retail. Because the sectoral agree-
ment model is not well established in East Germany, the German data
refer to West Germany. Data from the NES only include Great Britain.
Since 1980, real hourly wages for full-time male and female manual
workers in Germany and Britain have increased at the same rate, while
salaries per hour for non-manual workers have grown faster in Britain
than in Germany. Thus overall, hourly pay increased slightly more in
Britain. This is true in both engineering and retail (see Table 1), as well as
other sectors. Because of working-time reductions in Germany, the
increase in real, monthly gross earnings was considerably greater in
Britain than in Germany. In both countries, pay increased faster in engi-
neering than in retail.
In Britain, the ‘labour share’ for the economy as a whole (that is, the
share of employees’ gross earnings in GDP) was fairly stable over the two
decades, whereas in Germany there was a marked decrease (BMA, 2001).
The most evident differences can be found in pay inequality, which has
increased in Britain in recent years (although all categories of employees
received both nominal and real pay increases); whereas in Germany, small
increases in inequality between male employees are partly offset by a
decreasing gender pay gap (OECD, 2001: Ch. 2, Derived Indicators Table
1; direct additional information from the OECD).
German sectoral agreements mandate the same percentage of pay rise
for all workers employed under the same agreement, and structural
change in the composition of the labour force has been limited. Between
1980 and 2000, relative pay across job grades was fairly stable for non-
manual employees, though among manual workers there was increasing
inequality in the 1990s, especially for the lowest grades (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2002).
The British case deserves more scrutiny. If we take the ratio of the
lowest and the highest deciles to median earnings as 100 in 1978, this ratio
fell by 1998 for the lowest decile of male manual workers to 90.7 in
mechanical engineering (90.5 for non-manual males), 86.0 in electrical
engineering (83.0 for non-manual males), and 94.8 in retail (89.7 for non-
manual males). The ratio for the highest decile rose for manual males to
101.4 in mechanical engineering (113.5 for non-manual males), 113.2 in
electrical engineering (110.1 for non-manual males), and 118.9 in retail
(118.8 for non-manual males). The comparable figures for female
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(1)
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TABLE 1. Index of Real Hourly Wages for Full-Time Male Employees in (West) Germany and Great Britain, 1980–2000 (1980 = 100)
Manual males Non-manual males
Mechanical Electrical Mechanical Electrical Retail
engineering engineering engineering engineering
Germany GB Germany GB Germany GB Germany GB Germany GB
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1982 97.9 100.5 98.9 100.1 98.1 105.1 98.7 102.5 98.7 99.8
1984 98.0 103.0 98.8 102.7 100.0 111.5 100.9 107.6 93.7 104.1
1986 105.6 108.2 105.9 106.7 111.2 120.1 111.5 114.0 100.5 113.2
1988 113.4 111.9 114.3 109.4 120.1 129.3 121.2 119.7 106.6 127.0
1990 117.5 112.1 118.9 109.4 126.0 130.9 126.9 124.3 110.3 125.4
1992 120.5 118.1 121.3 117.9 127.0 132.4 130.5 129.5 118.2 126.2
1994 120.7 120.0 123.4 118.3 129.3 136.9 133.8 138.4 117.0 126.7
1996 128.0 125.2 129.0 120.8 140.0 144.4 144.4 142.0 110.7 136.5
1998 128.8 134.0 129.5 126.8 142.5 156.2 145.4 152.6 111.6 136.8
2000 130.8 139.1 130.6 130.2 143.5 155.8 144.7 159.4 111.6 143.4
Notes: Real hourly wages are derived from Gross hourly wages (gross monthly salaries divided by agreed working hours for non-manual
employees in Germany) deflated by consumer prices.
Source: Office for National Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, Sachverständigenrat. Own calculations.
employees were similar, with two marked exceptions: the increase in the
ratio of the highest decile to the median for non-manual females was
markedly higher than for males, while that for the lowest decile for
female manual workers in mechanical engineering actually increased
(ONS, 1978, 1998: Tables C74–7, C21–4, own calculations).
Between 1978 and 1998, the dispersion of wage increases for male
employees within the relevant sectors did not grow very much (see Table
2). The changes for female employees were more pronounced, but these
may reflect changes in the composition of the female labour force more
than the effects of decentralized wage determination. Arrowsmith et al.
(2000) compare the standard deviations of average increases for the years
1985 and 1994 (a period which is markedly shorter, but without any
classification changes; Standard Industrial Classification 1980 in both
years) and report little change. Based on their own survey, which gener-
ally confirms these findings, but was not restricted to pay changes alone,
Arrowsmith and Sisson (1999: 63) state: ‘the results suggest that, although
the settlement of pay and working time has formally become more local-
ized in engineering and retail, this has not necessarily involved a sea-
change in outcomes’.
The incidence of variable payment (pay related to output, achievement,
performance, and so on) is often regarded as an indicator of manage-
ment’s room for manoeuvre; a connection with industrial relations
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TABLE 2. Dispersion of Increases in Gross Weekly Earnings for Full-Time
Employees in Britain
Industry Males Females
Manual Non-manual Manual Non-manual
1978 1998 1978 1998 1978 1998 1978 1998
Mechanical engineering
(1978: SIC 1968, VII) 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 2.2 0.7 1.3
(1998: SIC 1992, 29)
Electrical engineering
(1978: SIC 1968, IX) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.2
(1998: SIC 1992, DL)
Retail distribution
(1978: SIC 1968, 820-1) 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.6
(1998: SIC 1992, 52)
Note: Figures show the standard error of the increase as a percentage of average
weekly earnings (overtime pay excluded).
Source: ONS (1978, 1998).
institutions should therefore be assumed. An Anglo-German comparison
of variable pay is, however, difficult. According to the NES, incentive pay
for manual workers decreased considerably in Britain between 1976 and
2000 (for ‘all industries and services’ as well as for ‘engineering’, though
‘retail’ is an exception). For non-manual workers, however, a slight
increase is reported (again with the exception of ‘retail’). In 2000, the
proportion of incentive pay to total pay was nearly the same for manual
and non-manual workers, and amounted to 3 percent on average for
males. According to our German survey in 1998, the shares for both engi-
neering and retail are remarkably higher: in engineering, for manual
workers it was 15 percent and for non-manual workers almost 7 percent,
while for non-manual workers in the retail sector it amounted to 9
percent. Other data indicate that the proportion of employees receiving
incentive-related pay has not changed in recent years in engineering
(Gesamtmetall, 2001; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1981, 1993/94, 1998). In
Germany as well as in Britain, there has been a shift from traditional
incentive pay (piecework) to newer bonus schemes, particularly among
non-manual employees, which may explain the increase in incentive pay
for this group.
Though the data from the two countries are not entirely comparable,
the message seems clear: the proportion of incentive pay in Germany is
higher and has remained unchanged, whereas in Britain the figures for all
employees indicate a decrease. However, the NES fails to record the full
scope of variable pay in Britain (Casey et al., 1992). Some forms (such as
merit pay, competency-related pay, and performance-related pay) do not
always clearly separate basic pay from incentive-related pay. Pay rises
dependent on individual performance, even though not absolutely
unknown in Germany (in particular, in workplaces not bound by collec-
tive agreements (Schmidt, 2004: 188)), seem to be more widespread in
Britain. These differences, however, are of limited importance: Arrow-
smith and Sisson (1999: 58) report very little evidence of the individual-
ization of pay. Even workplaces with performance-related pay rises often
make only a part of these dependent on performance; according to
Lawson (2000: 312), a cost-of-living increase is usually given to all
employees. Given the differences in schemes as well as in terminology, an
exact comparison between Britain and Germany is not possible. Never-
theless, there is no evidence that incentive pay is more important in
Britain than in Germany.
Altogether, comparing Britain and Germany we detect more similari-
ties than differences. Because the findings for pay increases are of particu-
lar interest from an industrial relations angle, in the following discussion
we focus on possible explanations.
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Surface Divergence, but Convergence of Substance?
German wage trends to some extent match the expectations of both insti-
tutional and neo-classical perspectives, but neither would predict the
British experience. Despite a massive decline in collective bargaining,
wage increases have on average been higher than in Germany. Can it be
that, behind the façade of formal agreements, the actual power relations
between capital and labour in Germany and Britain may be quite similar?
Kelly (1998) offers an approach which focuses on workers’ interests
and power relations between workers and employers. He criticizes
industrial relations theories which are centred around job regulation, the
joint institutions of capital and labour, and pleads for an approach which
focuses on the mobilization of workers’ autonomous power. Kelly’s
approach can be seen as a new version of a bargaining approach based on
Marxist class theory. Reformulating industrial relations according to this
approach promises a solution to the puzzle described above.
Union density has fallen in both Germany and Britain, and is now less
than 30 percent in both countries. Given that in the 1970s union density
in Britain was much higher than in Germany, it is justified to speak of a
convergence. The incidence and volume of strikes has shown a similar
trend, though working days lost in Britain are still considerably higher
than in Germany. As long as union membership and industrial action can
be seen as indicators of trade union strength and working-class power,
the influence of employees on determining pay should be no stronger in
Germany than in Britain. From this perspective, both the decrease of the
‘labour share’ in Germany and its stability in Britain are less surprising.
However, closer analysis does not support the mobilization approach
as an explanation for wage trends: the increase in real wages in Britain in
the 1980s and 1990s, which exceeded that of the 1970s, does not corre-
late with the decline in union density and industrial action. In addition,
today pay settlements in non-union firms are nearly the same as in union-
ized establishments. Whether the British unions are as strong as or even
stronger than the German unions, the simultaneous decrease in union
membership and growth in real pay cannot be explained with an
approach that defines industrial relations merely as antagonistic power
relations.
This neither means that there has been no connection between worker
mobilization and pay movements in the past, nor that there will be none
in the future. For the relevant period, however, there is no support for
such a link. Possible effects are, at least, more mediated than can be
explained by using the mobilization approach. It is necessary to return to
issues of efficiency, morale and mimetic isomorphism.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(1)
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‘Mimetic Wages’
The Problem of Uncertainty
As a starting-point, we set out our explanation in an ideal-typical fashion.
In principle, any single employer’s pay decisions (like other managerial
decisions) face the problem of uncertainty. Considering both the compe-
tition for employees in the labour market and cost competition in
commodity markets, the appropriateness of pay decisions depends not
only on internal calculations or negotiations, but also on the decisions of
other employers. In addition, as Ross (1948: 79) noted, ‘wage bargaining
looks forward, not backward’. Since no employer is able to anticipate
what other employers will decide, a constellation of ‘double contingency’
exists. Theoretically, no employer knows what an adequate pay decision
will be. But in practice, procedures are found which come close to a
solution.
The German system of industrial relations offers such a solution
through multi-employer bargaining. Once ratified, sectoral agreements
are binding for both employers and unions until their termination.
Downward deviation from the agreement is illegal for unions as well as
for members of the employers’ associations; only better conditions for
employees can be agreed at establishment level. Although not all German
employers are members of an association, ‘outside employers largely
follow the outcome of sectoral bargaining’ (Traxler, 1994: 178). Wage
agreements in one region set the intra-sectoral pattern for other regions
and are usually seen as a pattern for other sectors. One should not over-
estimate the inter-sectoral effects of ‘pattern bargaining’, but the sectoral
agreement still provides a strong signal that orients most employers
within the sector.
Since multi-employer agreements have collapsed in Britain, this
solution is no longer available. However, multi-employer bargaining
never played as central a role as it does in Germany; it was adapted by
plant or company bargaining within a two-tiered system. Here, the
contingency problem was solved in another simple, but effective way.
Unions at workplace level usually demanded ‘more’ than other unions
had achieved within the same establishment or in other establishments in
the region, whereas the employer’s objective was to achieve a settlement
markedly below the union claim. For British employers, therefore, it was
more important to have a good tactic to counter union demands or a
strategy to avoid union representation within the company. As long as
most pay settlements were negotiated, solving the wage problem
remained comparatively simple. Non-unionized companies could orient
their decisions towards pay settlements in similar companies or the
local ‘going rate’. As Ross (1948: 50) argued, such comparisons were
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important for the wage decisions of an employer, ‘whose greatest anxiety,
in the absence of imperative economic pressures, is to avoid “getting out
of the line”’. However, the need to follow the collective agreements in
unionized establishments has obviously lost importance for non-union-
ized establishments today.
No matter how ‘efficiency’ is defined and how convincing the particu-
lar theoretical arguments are, the underlying problem is that under the
condition of widespread efficiency wages (or wages to maintain ‘good
morale’, according to Bewley), single employers cannot know what are
the equilibrium wages. Therefore, employers in non-unionized establish-
ments have only two means at their disposal to decide what adequate
wages are: they can haggle with single employees about pay changes or
(like firms which still bargain with unions at company level) they can
look at other employers’ pay settlements (‘watch each other’, as White
(1981) puts it). The first method would cause high labour turnover and
transaction costs. Negative effects on employees’ ‘morale’ and ‘efficiency’
could be anticipated. The second method is essentially imitation. Wages
resulting from imitation should be called ‘mimetic wages’, rather than
‘market wages’ or ‘efficiency wages’.
Like efficiency wages, mimetic wages can avoid shirking and motivate
employees as if they were based on an ‘implicit contract’, although they
do not actually result from an employer’s estimation of ‘efficiency’ effects
at a particular workplace. In an ideal-typical system of mimetic wages,
‘paying what others pay’ is the only rule for employers to follow. Conse-
quently, if all employers participated in the game, pay would be deter-
mined entirely by earlier settlements. Thus, mimetic wages are
determined by history, not by the rules of the market. If this is the case,
the value of labour power is determined by ‘a historical and moral
element’, in a more radical sense than Marx thought, because there is no
quantifiable relationship to any ‘means of subsistence’. On the contrary,
wages determine what Marx (1975) says is ‘practically known’ as the
necessary means of subsistence: what is perceived as the normal standard
of living is an outcome of the wages that are usually paid.
Although employees and unions are in most cases not included in the
determination of mimetic wages (in this sense, decision-making is unilat-
eral), the employees’ consent is indispensable. Mimetic wages have to
substitute for the legitimating effects of both market pressure and
efficiency wages. This substitution occurs in a simple, but still efficacious
mechanism that results from the imitation process itself. Normally,
employees have two standards to which they can compare their current
wages: the level of wages they received in the past and the wages other
employees earn. In the case of mimetic wages, both comparisons lead to
satisfactory results. As long as employers ‘pay what others pay’,
employees will ‘get what others get’. Moreover, they receive the same as
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(1)
100
or, in the empirical case of Britain, a bit more than they got before. Of
course, the mechanism of mimetic wages always depends on environ-
mental preconditions, but assuming that these do not change, the mech-
anism is self-stabilizing.
Preconditions, Actors, and Limitations
The first precondition concerns the maintenance of employee satis-
faction. Employees have to rate the wages as ‘fair’, that is, as following
the principle of reciprocity. Because equilibrium wages are unknown and,
therefore, it is unclear what an ‘equal exchange’ would be, reciprocity can
only mean an exchange of money for services perceived as appropriate
(Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). To a certain degree, the accep-
tance of reciprocity can be described as a customary rule embedded in
everyday routines (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Since no absolute
criterion exists for the fairness of a pay decision, following the pay rises
of other employers becomes itself a matter of fairness. Thus, the imita-
tion of pay rises is not only a consequence of uncertainty and mimetic
isomorphism, but determines what is to be regarded as fair.
However, what is perceived as fair pay is not independent of other
societal influences; it depends on public discourse. Reciprocity can be
redefined by the actors. The demands of both owners and employees may
increase and thus destabilize the mechanism of imitation. Shareholders
may demand higher dividends and trade unions may agitate against
management rewards and worker exploitation. Such effects are histori-
cally evident, but the latter, in particular, has obviously been weak in
recent years. To summarize, the maintenance of fairness and of the
proportional development of demands is an indispensable precondition
of the mimetic wage mechanism, which seems to have an ‘elective affinity’
with social partnership: the latter is favoured by the former and vice
versa.
A second prerequisite is the employers’ ability to pay. Although it is
not possible to say what the adequate level of pay is, wages are limited
by sales and production costs. In a closed economy, the cost limit can be
regarded as elastic because wage increases can cause inflation in lieu of
sales decreases. In the extraordinarily internationalized British economy
(Hirst and Thompson, 2000), this possibility is limited: cost reduction
without pay cuts requires redundancies. Arrowsmith and Sisson identify
these as the ‘downside’ of efficiency wages and stress that, in contradic-
tion to the postulated political objectives of decentralized wage determi-
nation, ‘the employed “insiders” benefit at the expense of the
unemployed “outsiders”’ (2001: 149).
Third, the mechanism of producing mimetic wages requires great tran-
sparency: a company’s management requires information on standards in
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other firms in order to match these (or to pay more or less). But even if
the information about former pay rises is available, management cannot
predict future decisions by its competitors. Mimetic wages depend on
high transparency concerning past decisions and a convincing assump-
tion about future trends. This implies a stable ‘system’ integrated by
common norms, procedures, or other institutions.
The mechanism of pay determination in Britain is driven by several
actors. There are employers and managers, who have the formal right to
decide; the state has gained more importance in recent years (the National
Minimum Wage); and employers’ associations still play a certain role. In
addition, agencies gathering and providing information on pay and
conditions have gained importance. Trade unions are also still among
these collective actors: today, mainly at company level and only in a
minority of workplaces. Analysing data from WERS98, Forth and
Millward (2000: 14) conclude that
bargained arrangements were more likely than non-bargained ones to
have produced settlements that were comparable to those of similar
workers in the same industry or locality. Some 87 per cent of bargained
arrangements generated settlements that were in line with the industry
norm, whilst 79 per cent of settlements were in line with the local average.
The figures for non-bargained settlements were 72 per cent and 67 per
cent respectively.
These figures ‘lend support to the idea that trade unions reduce the vari-
ability of pay settlements’.
This does not mean that union pressure leads to higher wages, but it
does help to bring settlements closer to the average. According to
WERS98, managers reported that industrial action or its threat had prac-
tically no effect on the size of pay settlements (Millward et al., 2000:
205–12). It seems that British unions participate in the process of pay
determination, but the objective of meeting the normal level of pay settle-
ments is not really under discussion. In some workplaces, unions are very
likely better informed about other establishments’ pay settlements than
are the employers. In addition, since receiving the ‘going rate’ can be seen
as a matter of ‘fairness’, shop stewards might gain more support from the
workers for pressure for standard increases than for higher pay rises.
Asking managers about the factors influencing pay rises, the results of
WERS98 show two major influences:
Employers very commonly cite the inflation rate as a major influence
upon the size of settlements, but they also commonly say that settlements
are the same for their employees as for others in the same industry. It is
difficult to disentangle these two influences. However, we produce some
empirical evidence that both are at work: private sector settlements were
probably higher when background inflation was higher; and there is some
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evidence of employers following a ‘going rate’ [of increase] in their
industry. (Forth and Millward, 2000: 25)
Trade unionists confirm this, in particular with respect to engineering
industries:
Although there is no longer any national bargaining . . . the Engineering
Employers’ Federation both at regional and national levels does provide
an awful lot of information. The unions obviously know what the rates
are as well. And there’s just huge consensus about going rates. I can’t
explain that. It just happens to be the case and it’s almost as if it’s taking
pay out of the sphere of dispute really. You’re arguing about half a
percentage point here and there. (Trade union officer, UK)
Regular pay rounds, still widespread according to Arrowsmith and
Sisson (1999: 58), contribute to both transparency and reasonable expec-
tations about temporary wage stability. Without them, it would be more
difficult to know what pay rises take place, and assessing future develop-
ments would be much harder. Regular pay rounds are a survival of collec-
tive bargaining and traditional industrial relations. Whether formally
agreed or not, a limited term is a natural feature of a pay agreement.
Although regular pay rounds are also functional for the mechanism of
mimetic wages, it is doubtful whether they would emerge under the
precondition of a non-bargaining environment. Apparently, a history of
widespread collective bargaining is a necessary condition for establishing
a formal, unilateral, but stable and successful mechanism of wage deter-
mination. Therefore, distinct bargaining histories cause differences
between isomorphic mechanisms in the engineering and retail sectors. In
engineering, a history of multi-employer bargaining had created favour-
able conditions for the mimetic wage mechanism. The bargaining legacy
in retail is more heterogeneous. Whereas large employers had agreements
with trade unions (for example, Tesco) or substituted for unions by being
a ‘good employer’ (for example, Marks & Spencer), small retailers often
offered poor pay and conditions. The second report of the Low Pay
Commission (2000: 42) states that the ‘retail sector has the largest number
of workers affected by the introduction of the National Minimum Wage’,
but that these effects are almost completely restricted to small firms.
Although statistically retail is regarded as one sector, it actually seems to
be divided into more than one ‘organizational field’. In summary,
whereas the engineering sector almost completely participates in the
mimetic wage mechanism, positive wage isomorphism applies only to a
segment of the retail sector. This marks a difference with Germany, where
until recently collective agreements became binding for the whole retail
sector through statutory extension.
Because average pay increases within the ‘isomorphic sectors’ are
currently above the rate of inflation, the latter cannot determine the final
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amount of rises. Nevertheless, the cost-of-living increase is an important
figure. However, since assumptions on future developments cannot be
avoided, even pay rises based on the rate of inflation can be a problem
for employers, especially when inflation is high and fluctuating, as it was
in the 1970s. In such an environment, a settlement always bears the risk
of being considerably above or below the inflation rate. Therefore, each
party tries to pass on the risk to the other, which makes it difficult to
achieve an agreement without taking industrial action. In recent years,
inflation has been low, which has had an impact on rationalizing pay
decisions. Moreover, pay rises which meet or slightly exceed the inflation
rate seem to be highly legitimized.
However, stability and transparency are also important influences on
pay rises, which have exceeded inflation in recent times. Without assist-
ance, single employers would not have enough information on wage
movements, and several specialized agencies have been established to
provide (sectorally differentiated) pay data for employers. While the
primary function of these agencies is to spread information on current
trends, their assessment of future developments also has an impact on
employers’ pay decisions. Their accumulated expertise also allows these
agencies to act as business consultants in a broader sense: they can tell an
employer not only what others do, but what should be done. In other
words, they not only mirror pay decisions, but play an active role in
influencing further decisions by recommending ‘best practices’. Incomes
Data Services (IDS), Industrial Relations Services (IRS) and the Hay
group are three of these agencies and their activities are not restricted to
the issue of pay rises. For example, Hay’s pay databank includes not only
pay rates, but also points resulting from many companies’ analytical job
evaluation.
After the demise of multi-employer bargaining, some employers’
associations have changed their function and have also become infor-
mation agencies for their members. The EEF, for instance, is still an
important information source for its member companies. The Confeder-
ation of British Industry (CBI) has its own pay databank and the Labour
Research Department (LRD) regularly offers pay data to trade unions.
Based on their panel survey, Arrowsmith and Sisson (1999) also stress
that when management networks are taken into account, there is less
fragmentation in determining pay and conditions in Britain than the
absence of multi-employer bargaining would imply. In order to empha-
size the role of the ‘pay-and-conditions information agencies’ within this
system of determining pay and conditions, we speak of it as ‘the bench-
marking system’.
Finally, we have to return to the question of labour market effects. We
do not completely deny such influences, since the possession of other-
wise scarce qualifications by some specialists in the engineering sector
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may be rewarded by ‘merit pay’ or ‘performance-related pay’ above the
average. But against a background of staff reductions this hardly explains
the wage trends described for this sector. (Despite sectoral agreements in
German engineering, similar effects occur there anyway.) In the British
retail sector, the opposite deviation from sectoral wage trends can be
found. However, probably this does not signal labour market effects for
individual employer’s wage decisions, but distinct fields of wage deter-
mination connected to different retail formats (that is, distinct ‘organiz-
ational fields’). The example of retail shows, nevertheless, that mimetic
wage isomorphism does not guarantee pay increases. Firms with poorly
qualified and easily replaceable employees can follow an alternative
course of organizational development. However, this should be regarded
as a form of ‘bad isomorphism’ rather than be equated with market deter-
mination.
Concluding Remarks
We have focused on analysing the benchmarking system with respect to
pay rises. In principle, its mechanisms are not restricted to mimetic
wages. De facto, much management knowledge of ‘best’ or even common
practices is transferred to companies by ‘information agencies’ or by
unmediated orientation towards other companies’ practices. This applies
to grading structures and incentive pay, but here the differences between
companies are more distinct: benchmarking effects produce less isomor-
phism on these issues, partly because it is more difficult to obtain data in
a comparative form (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2001: 144).
Compared with the sectoral agreement model, the benchmarking
system lacks the capability of control. Within this system neither
employees and trade unions nor employers can articulate and push for
their collective class interests. Pay and conditions are a result of decen-
tralized action, despite some relevant effects from the ‘information
agencies’. In Germany, employers and trade unions can agree on
‘moderate’ pay rises without risking negative efficiency effects or
damaging employees’ morale in a single organization. The British bench-
marking system, however, does not allow for consciously controlled
changes without state intervention. As a result, in a situation of weak
union power, small wage increases are more likely to occur in Germany
than in Britain.
The current high earnings inequality in Britain represents an import-
ant difference from both Germany and the former British situation. In
this respect, trade union participation obviously matters. Metcalf et al.
(2000: 16) conclude that even today ‘workers in the organised sector have
much lower pay dispersion than those in the unorganised sector’ and that
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‘unions narrow the wage differentials between women and men, blacks
and whites, those with health problems and those without, and between
manual and non-manual workers’. In order to avoid problems for social
cohesion, state intervention seems to be more necessary under current
British conditions than in Germany. Thus, the British state has to act to
limit social inequality via the National Minimum Wage legislation.
Apparently, the main difference between the British and German
models is that between a voluntary mechanism to achieve isomorphism
and a coercive one. However, this difference is less decisive than it seems.
Although German sectoral agreements are legally enforceable, employ-
ers can leave their associations and subsequently escape the sectoral
agreements. As noted earlier, unaffiliated employers have always decided
voluntarily whether to observe the sectoral agreement through mimetic
isomorphism. If single employers withdraw from multi-employer
bargaining and refuse to adapt voluntarily, German and British unions
are in a similar situation.
The stability of both the German sectoral agreement model and the
British benchmarking system depend on the employers’ willingness to
participate. But whether this can be maintained depends on each
employer’s calculations as well as on normative rules and customary
practices. Experiences in East Germany are one of the factors which cast
doubt on practices once taken for granted in West Germany. If individ-
ual employers leave multi-employer agreements, they place pressure on
trade unions for concession bargaining at sectoral level, but may still
decide on pay and conditions with regard to the agreement. Under these
circumstances, free riding is an attraction for German employers. But
abandoning the imitation process results in the risks mentioned previ-
ously: the difficulties of knowing the market level for wages and
conditions, and the erosion of employees’ commitment. Therefore, a
change from the sectoral agreement model to the benchmarking system
seems more likely than a switch to market determination.
Thus, if the sectoral agreement model in Germany continues to erode,
it seems improbable that this would lead to a determination of pay and
conditions by the market, but rather to mechanisms similar to those in
Britain: mimetic wages and uncontrolled isomorphism, along with
growing earnings inequality between employees. With state assistance
both inequality and pay rises could be restricted, but the latter seems
unlikely in the foreseeable future. Especially for employers, therefore,
dismantling the German sectoral agreement model would hold serious
risks. Although the behaviour of single employers within a benchmark-
ing system can be explained not only by institutionalized routines, but
also by rational decisions under conditions of uncertainty, the system as
a whole lacks rationality and is beyond societal control.
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